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Abstract Juries in medical malpractice trials are viewed
as incompetent, antidoctor, irresponsible in awarding
damages to patients, and casting a threatening shadow over
the settlement process. Several decades of systematic
empirical research yields little support for these claims.
This article summarizes those findings. Doctors win about
three cases of four that go to trial. Juries are skeptical about
inflated claims. Jury verdicts on negligence are roughly
similar to assessments made by medical experts and judges.
Damage awards tend to correlate positively with the
severity of injury. There are defensible reasons for large
damage awards. Moreover, the largest awards are typically
settled for much less than the verdicts.
Introduction
In 1988, a task force of the American Medical Association
asserted that ‘‘problems with medical malpractice juries
include decisions that are not based on a thorough under-
standing of the medical facts and awards that increase at an
alarming rate and in a fashion that seems uniquely to dis-
advantage physicians as compared with other individuals
who have acted negligently’’ [19]. In 2003, the AMA
claimed that ‘‘[t]he primary cause of the growing liability
crisis is the unrestrained escalation in jury awards that are a
part of a legal system that in many states is simply out of
control’’ [1]. In 2008, there were continuing claims of a
crisis with calls for a cap on the pain and suffering com-
ponent of jury awards, presumably because juries are some
combination of incompetent, antidoctor, and irresponsible
[2, 5, 30].
Systematic empirical research on the jury system col-
lected over the past several decades yields evidence
inconsistent with these claims. This brief article will
review some of the findings, but to do so, I will also
describe the jury system for context.
Incidence, Cost, and Claiming Rates
It is crucial as a first step to acknowledge medical negli-
gence does occur. Even though the size of the estimates of
its incidence vary and are contested, even the lowest esti-
mates conclude that annual death rates across the United
States for this cause number at least 100,000 persons and
many more suffer serious injuries, some of them grave
[27, 36].
Estimates of the cost of negligent medical injuries must
take into account not only past and future medical expenses
but also lost income. One study published in 1989 exam-
ined the economic costs for serious birth injuries and
injuries that occurred in emergency rooms [28]. Adjusted
to 2008 dollars, the average loss for birth injuries was $2.5
million and for emergency room incidents it was $2.3
million. For patients who died as a result of negligent
emergency room treatment, the economic losses were
estimated at $1.1 million in 2007 dollars.
Research from a number of studies yields estimates that
only about one in 25 patients with a negligent or prevent-
able medical claim brought a lawsuit against the health
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provider [4]. There are various reasons why the claiming
rates are so low relative to incidence. These include
reluctance to sue the doctor who is perceived as trying to
help, the tendency to attribute the adverse outcome to the
underling illness for which they sought treatment rather
than a result of negligence, and the inability to find a
lawyer willing to file a lawsuit because of the low proba-
bility of success [36]. Nevertheless, the Henry J. Kaiser
Foundation reported that in 2006 there were 12,513 paid
claims in the United States, resulting in an aggregate total
payment of almost $4 billion involving approximately 13
out of 1000 active, nonfederal physicians [16].
The Incidence and Outcomes of Jury Trials
Juries decide only about 7% of medical malpractice law-
suits [40, 42]. In 2001, the latest year for which there are
reliable figures, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics esti-
mated that in the nation’s 75 largest counties there were
over 1100 malpractice cases tried before juries [7, 8].
Plaintiffs won only 27% of these trials, about one case in
four [8]. However, when the plaintiffs did win, the median
award was $422,000, a figure well above median awards in
torts and other civil lawsuits. And 16% of the time, the
award equaled or exceeded $1 million [7]. Punitive dam-
ages are rarely awarded in malpractice cases except in
cases of gross malfeasance, such as sexual assaults on
patients or fraudulent altering of medical records [36]. In
2001, for example, there were only 15 punitive awards out
of 1156 medical malpractice trials in the nation’s 75 largest
counties; the median punitive award in these cases was
$187,000; two punitive awards exceeded $1 million [7].
The fact that plaintiffs won approximately one case in
four tried before a jury—or stated in the obverse, doctors
won three out of four trials—suggests that juries do not
automatically side with patients over doctors. However, the
statistics hide something that needs to be recognized. Some
of the patients who lost at trial did not come away empty-
handed. In some instances more than one healthcare pro-
vider may be named in the lawsuit. For some of the
defendants, their legal negligence is reasonably clear and
they settle prior to trial, sometimes for major amounts of
money, leaving the remaining defendant or defendants.
Compared to defendants who settled, the evidence of
negligence is relatively weaker against these defendants
who remain in the lawsuit and they prevail at trial [34, 36].
This partly explains patients’ poor win rates before juries.
As noted above, a substantial portion of jury awards
exceed $1 million; and these cases make the newspaper
headlines. Recent research by Vidmar et al. [40, 42]
examined comprehensive medical insurers’ closed claim
files that were required to be reported to the Florida
Department of Insurance. Between 1990 and the end of
2004 there were 801 cases involving payments of $1 mil-
lion or more. Only 54 of those payments were made after a
jury trial. The rest involved settlements before trial. Of
particular interest, there were 115 cases in which a pay-
ment of $1 million or more was paid without a lawsuit ever
being filed. Thus, voluntary settlements without a lawsuit
were twice as common as payments following jury ver-
dicts. Presumably the no-lawsuit payments were made
because the liability was so clear that it made no sense to
dispute the case and incur heavy legal fees for a cause that
was sure to be lost if the case went to trial. Another finding
was that 34 of the cases involved ‘‘mega-awards,’’ that is,
payments exceeding $5 million. Only two of these mega-
settlements were made after a jury verdict. The rest were
settled at an earlier stage in the disputing process. The data
also indicated the patients in both types of resolution had
suffered very serious injuries such as paraplegia, quadri-
plegia, severe brain injuries, or death. Some of the
deceased persons had survived for weeks in a vegetative
state and others had left multiple heirs who were minors
[40].
Overall, jury decisions accounted for only 2.3% of paid
Florida medical negligence claims. To some degree, how-
ever, they probably did cast a shadow over the settlement
process. Lawyers tend to negotiate partly around the
amount a jury might award if the case goes to trial. Yet, the
shadow effect is not as direct as it might seem. Research on
samples of insurers’ medical malpractice files indicate that
insurers tend to settle cases primarily based on whether
their own internal reviews by medical experts indicate the
healthcare provider violated the standard of care [23, 24]. If
they decide the standard has been violated an attempt will
be made to settle. Negotiating postures involve not just
prior jury awards but prior settlements in cases with similar
injuries. Claims proceed to trial only when the plaintiff
cannot be convinced that there was no violation of the
standard, or if the plaintiff and insurer cannot agree on
what constitutes a reasonable amount for the settlement.
Contrary to much folklore among doctors about ‘‘frivolous
cases,’’ no payments tend to be made for claims in which
the defense lawyers and liability insurers decide there was
no lapse in the standard of care [4].
Juror Skepticism about Lawsuits
There is still an additional reason for plaintiffs winning
only slightly one trial in four: juror attitudes. One of the
most persistent claims against juries is that they are swayed
in favor of the plaintiff by sympathies and hostilities
toward doctors. Yet, research consistently contradicts this
view. Vidmar found that jurors who served on medical
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malpractice trials in North Carolina described their atti-
tudes along two main themes: too many people want to get
something for nothing; and most doctors try to help people
and should not be blamed for simple human misjudgment
or a momentary lapse of concentration [34, 36]. Even in
some instances in which they decided for the patient, jurors
expressed concern about the decision’s adverse effect on
the doctor’s practice. This juror skepticism about personal
injury claims extends beyond medical malpractice cases.
Hans and Lofquist [14, 15] conducted interviews with
jurors in a large study of cases involving individuals with
claims against businesses and health provider defendants.
They found that jurors often penalized plaintiffs who did
not meet high standards of credibility and behavior,
including those who did not appear as injured as they
claimed, those with preexisting medical conditions, and
those who did not do enough to help themselves recover
from their injuries. Thus, despite media accounts of jury
irresponsibility, skepticism about getting something for
nothing is rooted in American culture [12]. Of course, this
does not mean that in every case jurors hold such views.
Sometimes trial evidence about a health provider’s mal-
feasance causes jurors to be angry even when they began
the trial with open minds [34].
Jury Verdicts Compared to Medical Judgments
A 1998 report of the AMA voiced a common complaint
about the ability of layperson jurors to decide medical
negligence:
Juries are not optimally suited to decide the compli-
cated issues of causation and duty of care. …With
respect to the major elements of liability—duty of
care and causation—the parties must present expert
testimony, which the jurors cannot evaluate inde-
pendently [1].
If this claim is valid, an ideal study would be to compare
the judgments of medical doctors to the verdicts rendered
by juries. A study by Taragin et al. [31] did just that. The
study utilized data from the closed claim files of a medical
liability insurer. The insurers had medical doctors closely
examine the medical records in cases involving claims of
medical negligence to determine if medical negligence had
occurred. Tarragin et al. [31] compared these judgments
with verdicts rendered by juries if the case went to trial.
The jury verdicts tended to be consistent with the medical
judgments. Moreover, the study found that verdicts were
not related to the severity of the injury suffered by the
plaintiff, an indication that juries were not basing their
judgment out of mere sympathy for a seriously injured
patient. Farber and White [13] also compared jury verdicts
to hospital records bearing on negligence. Those authors
found that the jury verdicts favored the hospital in all cases
that the hospital had rated as not-negligent.
In a 2006 New England Journal of Medicine study by a
group of researchers associated with the Harvard School of
Public Health [29], a team of medically trained personnel
systematically examined the medical records and other data
from over 1400 randomly chosen closed insurance claims
in four different regions of the United States. Ratings were
made as to whether the case involved a negligent error or
no negligent medical error. The medical professionals
concluded that, overall, 1
.
3 of the claims did not involve
negligent medical error. Only one nonerror claim in four
resulted in a payment. Fifteen percent of the claims (208
cases) were decided at trial. Plaintiffs prevailed only 21%
of the time. Nonerror claims, as judged by these physician
raters, were twice as likely as error claims to go to trial and
1
.
3 as likely to result in a plaintiff win. (Reasons for
nonerror claims going to trial include the unreliability or
bias in the physician ratings, decisions on the part of
plaintiffs to go to trial after investing so much time and
money in the discovery phase of the lawsuit and uncer-
tainty in the litigation process, as well as a number of other
factors [34].)
None of these studies found a perfect correlation
between verdicts and medical personnel. On the other
hand, rates of reliability between the medical professionals
and assessments are not perfect either. In the New England
Journal of Medicine study [29], for example, the medical
professionals had high confidence in their judgments of
negligent error in only 44% of the cases, with moderate
confidence in an additional 30% and low confidence in the
remaining 23%. The study of Tarragin et al. [31] similarly
found that doctors frequently disagreed about the presence
or absence of negligence.
Judges Agree with Jury Verdicts
Some studies have asked trial judges to make independent
assessments of who should have prevailed in civil cases
over which they presided [17, 20, 38]. The judgments were
made while the jury was still deliberating and therefore
were not contaminated by knowledge of the outcome. The
judge’s decision was then compared to the jury verdict in
that case. Although the research did not specifically focus
on malpractice juries (some malpractice cases and other
complex cases were in the sample), the findings indicate
that there was high agreement between the judge and the
jury. Moreover, in instances when the judge would have
decided differently than the jury, the judge usually indi-
cated that nevertheless, the jury could reasonably have
come to a different conclusion from the trial evidence.
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These findings are reviewed in detail in Vidmar and Hans’
American Juries: The Verdict [38].
Jury Deliberations
The Arizona Jury Study Project involved the in-depth study
of 50 Arizona civil juries, including the examination of
questions jurors asked of experts and videotapes of their
jury room deliberations [11, 35, 38]. Data from that
research show jurors are actively involved in scrutinizing
expert medical testimony. Jurors in Arizona are encouraged
to write down questions that they want a witness to answer.
Consider the following example regarding medical testi-
mony about the results of an injury:
Why [are there] no medical records beyond the two
years prior to the accident? What tests or determi-
nation besides subjective patient’s say-so determined
[your diagnosis of] a migraine? What exact symp-
toms did he have regarding a migraine? Why no other
tests to rule out other neurological problems? Is there
a measurement for the amount of serotonin in his
brain? What causes serotonin not to work properly? Is
surgery a last resort? What is indomethacin? Can it
cause problems if you have prostate problems? [38]
In another accident case, a radiologist testified about a
knee injury. Here are the written questions that jurors
wanted the witness to answer:
Did you see the tears in the meniscus? Do you see
degeneration in young people and what about people
of the plaintiff’s age? Is a tear in the meniscus a
loosening, lack, or gash in the cartilage? Can you tell
the age of a tear due to an injury? Can you see healed
tissue in an MRI? Do cartilage tears heal by them-
selves? Can healed tears appear younger [more
recent] than they really are? [38]
In still another negligence case, jury deliberations
focused on the standard of care. After looking at various
exhibits, the jurors’ deliberations focused on the standard
of care:
Juror 9: [reading from the instructions] It asks
whether the defendant, John Cerutti, was negligent,
right? This information we are looking at is some-
thing that has been approved by both sides, both sides
have …
Juror 5: What page are we on?
Juror 9: Page 10, and I think he was negligent
because it says in here, it speaks of basing his pro-
cesses and procedures according to what other
chiropractors
Juror 6: The standard of care!
Juror 9: [continues] At the time as well, okay, I know
I saw it …
Juror 8: [reading] ‘‘Chiropractic negligence is the
failure to comply with the applicable standard of care.
To comply with the applicable standard of care, a
chiropractor must exercise that degree of care, skill,
and learning that would be expected under similar
circumstances of a reasonably prudent chiropractic
within this state’’
Juror 9: Okay, we’re looking at what they’ve given
us, and I’m only talking here, I’m not saying he was
negligent as far as causing, it says here, ‘‘the defen-
dant negligence was a cause of injury to the
plaintiff.’’ I’m not agreeing with that, but I think he
was negligent in the fact that he didn’t take any notes
[regarding the treatment he gave].
Juror 4: Ah, but wait a second, that’s care, skill, and
learning, and we have to, we aren’t looking at
whether he took notes, or not, I don’t think we are
basing this thing on.
Juror 3: He was not required to take notes.
Juror 4: He was not required to and …
Juror 3: By law.
Juror 4: So there would be no standard at the time.
Juror 9: [reading from the instructions] It says, ‘‘…
and learning that would be expected under similar
circumstances of a reasonably prudent chiropractor
within this state.’’ The only other chiropractic they
brought as evidence from this state was Dr. Beale.
Juror 3: But, Dr. Beale was making records after the
law was in effect.
Juror 9: Okay, so we don’t …
[a few minutes later]
Juror 9: Do we agree, that we believe that the dam-
age, whatever damage that happened, that he’s, the
alleged damage, if it was caused by Dr. Cerutti, pri-
marily in March and not July l?
Juror 4: Before we even ask that, does anybody here
believe that Dr. Cerutti caused the damage that, uh,
Mildred Stuart suffered?
Juror 8: If we agree on that we don’t have to go any
farther.
Juror 4: I mean, quite frankly, that’s the main ques-
tion, do we believe Dr. Cerutti caused the damage
that Mildred Stuart is suffering? [38]
These brief excerpts suggest that juries are anything but
passive participants who simply defer to experts or just
superficially gloss over the standard of care [21, 22, 37, 38].
And they are consistent with the other data showing agree-
ment between medical experts and jury verdicts. A study
by Schuman et al. [26] involved interviews with jurors
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following expert testimony in trials, leading them to con-
clude as follows:
We did not find evidence of a ‘‘white coat syndrome’’
in which jurors mechanistically deferred to certain
experts because of their field of expertise. Instead we
found jurors far more skeptical and demanding in
their assessments.
Jurors made expert-specific decisions based on a
sensible set of considerations—the expert’s qualifi-
cations, reasoning, factual familiarity and
impartiality. Our data do not lend support to the
critics who paint jurors as gullible, naı¨ve or
thoughtless persons who resort to irrational decision-
making strategies that rely on superficial consider-
ations [26].
Damages: The Absence of a ‘‘Deep Pocket Effect’’
Closely related to the claim of jury sympathy is the charge
that juries are more likely to render verdicts against doctors
and hospitals, not because they are seen as negligent, but
because the jurors perceive them as having the ability to
pay large awards. As described in Business on Trial,
Valerie Hans reviewed evidence from multiple studies
regarding business corporations and healthcare providers
and could not document systematic evidence of a deep-
pockets effect [15]. Vidmar and colleagues conducted
experiments that specifically tested for a deep-pockets
effect in medical malpractice cases [33, 34, 39, 43]. In one
experiment, 147 people called for jury duty were asked to
award damages for pain and suffering in the case of a
young woman who suffered a broken leg and resulting
complications. For one set of jurors, the cause was ascribed
to medical negligence. For other jurors, the cause of the
broken leg was a motor vehicle accident. There was no
statistically significant difference in awards. A second
experiment was similar, except that the case involved more
severe and permanent injuries. Results again showed no
statistically significant difference between awards in the
medical malpractice and automobile cases.
Damage Awards Tend to Correlate With Severity
of Injury
Bovbjerg et al. [6] found the magnitude of jury awards in a
sample of medical malpractice tort cases positively corre-
lated with the severity of the plaintiffs’ injuries, except that
injuries resulting in death tended to result in awards sub-
stantially lower than injuries resulting in severe permanent
injury, such as quadriplegia. However, those authors
concluded that there was considerable variability of dam-
age awards within categories of injury severity. Once
again, we have to examine this conclusion in more detail.
Michael Saks has used the terms vertical and horizontal
equity to categorize issues related to jury variability [25].
Vertical equity refers to the degree to which jury awards
are positively related to the seriousness of the injury.
Horizontal equity is the degree to which awards vary
within levels of injury severity.
While the Bovbjerg et al. [6] findings suggest vertical
but not horizontal inequity in jury awards, subsequent
research by Sloan and van Wert [28] provided a plausible
explanation for the variability, namely that economic los-
ses vary considerably within each level of injury severity.
For example, the economic loss for a quadriplegic who is
40 years old with a yearly income of $200,000 and a
family of three young children would ordinarily be much
greater than an identical quadriplegic who is retired, wid-
owed, 75 years old, has no dependents, and whose annual
income never exceeded $35,000 [36].
In two studies Vidmar and co-authors examined medical
malpractice verdicts in Florida and found that the general
damages portion of awards was positively related to
severity of the plaintiffs’ injuries [40, 42]. That is, the more
serious the injury the higher the mean and median levels of
general damages. The exception to this trend was that in
cases involving death, the mean and median awards tended
to be substantially lower than in cases of very serious
permanent disabilities. While these verdict statistics pro-
vide no information on the actual basis of the jury’s
decisions, there is no evidence that these decisions result
from caprice or unwarranted sympathy. Daniels and Martin
found a similar pattern in their study [9].
The ‘‘Pain and Suffering’’ Component of Awards
The general damages portion of verdicts is often labeled
‘‘pain and suffering.’’ This component, it is claimed,
accounts for the largest portion of medical negligence
awards and has provoked calls for limits or ‘‘caps’’ on the
amount that can be awarded for these general damages.
‘‘Pain and suffering’’ as an overall description for general
damages is an inappropriate label because some of the
elements of general damages involve injuries that are not
strictly pain and suffering [36]. In medical malpractice
cases, for example, negligent administration of a drug that
makes the patient permanently psychotic would be a severe
trauma that, aside from medication and health care, can
have many other economic consequences, including
diminished job performance.
Interviews with North Carolina jurors who decided
medical malpractice cases provided insights on how jurors
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reasoned about such injuries [34]. The jurors reported that
they considered the effects of disfigurement and emotional
trauma on chances for promotion, the likelihood of a
marriage dissolving as a result of the injury, and the eco-
nomic consequences as well as strict pain and suffering.
Vidmar also conducted several experiments to study juror
reasoning in malpractice cases [34]. Persons awaiting jury
duty in several North Carolina courts were provided with
detailed summaries of the injuries of persons injured
through medical negligence and asked to award damages
for pain and suffering and disfigurement. Senior lawyers,
including some retired North Carolina judges, were inde-
pendently presented with the same documents/facts and
asked to indicate their professional judgment about the
appropriate award. The data showed that jurors tended to
render awards similar to those of legal professionals. The
data also showed that jurors’ reasoning on damages was
similar to that of the professional lawyers and former
judges.
The above findings are consistent with substantial bod-
ies of research on attitudes toward plaintiff claims. Vidmar
and Hans summarized these findings in a recent book,
American Juries: The Verdict [38]. Despite the widely
accepted media accounts of overly generous juries, these
studies suggest that, in general, jurors are skeptical of
plaintiff claims about damages, especially pain and suf-
fering. They ask whether the claim of injury is as
debilitating as the plaintiff claims it is. They discount the
injury if the plaintiff did not take steps to mitigate the
effects of the injury. They are skeptical about people
wanting something for nothing and about the plaintiff
lawyers who have an investment in a large award. Despite
judicial instructions that they are to ignore whether the
plaintiff has health or other insurance to offset financial
losses, jurors speculate about whether the plaintiff has
insurance. In the study of Arizona civil juries, insurance
was discussed in 34 of 40 trials in which the jury decided
the defendant was negligent [10, 38]. Moreover, the data
showed that most often it was the plaintiff’s insurance
rather then the defendant’s insurance that was discussed in
the jury room [10]. Jury deliberations were punctuated by
statements like, ‘‘Every time somebody gets hurt they want
to sue somebody,’’ and ‘‘He had insurance, he [has a job]
and had insurance, and much has probably already been
paid for’’ [10].
Regardless, there are instances of awards with large
general damages components. Some of these verdicts may
indeed be a result of errant juries but there is an alternative
explanation. In his research on North Carolina juries Vid-
mar found that in many of the trials the healthcare
defendant fought the case on the grounds that he or she was
not negligent, but produced no testimony contesting the
plaintiff’s estimate of damages [34]. Thus, when the jury
decided the doctor was negligent the jury had only the
plaintiff’s estimate of damages. Interviews with jurors
indicated they were uncomfortable in relying on the
plaintiff’s financial estimates, but they followed the judge’s
instructions to decide the case solely on the evidence pre-
sented at trial and the only evidence they had was the
plaintiff’s estimate.
‘‘Mega’’ Awards
There are, of course, some very large medical malpractice
awards. Yet, as described earlier in this article, most of the
mega awards in Florida, that is, those resulting in payments
of $1 million or more, were a result of settlements rather
than jury trial. Further examination of those cases docu-
mented the seriousness of injuries suffered by plaintiffs
[42]. The injuries included quadriplegia, massive sepsis,
and death 5 months after surgery; an injury requiring rad-
ical resection of the throat, a feeding tube; requirement of
an electrolarynx to speak and eventual recurrence of cancer
and then death; paralysis on left side, permanent bladder
catheter, and lifetime assisted living; a newborn child, age
7 at trial, with partial paralysis seizure disorders, inability
to speak, and visual impairment. In another instance set-
tlement involved the minor children of an injured patient: a
39-year-old woman was left in a vegetative state and her
four minor dependents received annuities. In many
instances annuities for lifetime care were purchased as part
of the settlement. The expected yield of the annuities over
the projected lifetime of the patient indicated that the actual
financial cost of the injury was many times the settlement,
in one instance over $13 million.
Explanations for Increased Jury Damage Awards
The Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that in 2001
the median inflation-adjusted verdict in medical malprac-
tice trials when plaintiffs prevailed was $431,000,
compared to $253,000 in 1992 [8]. Multiple reasons may
be offered for the increase. Juries may have become more
generous. Patients may have sustained more serious inju-
ries. Alternatively, plaintiff lawyers may have become
more adept at ‘‘proving’’ damages by using experts who
document economic losses better than in the past. The cost
of negligent medical injuries and lost income may have
increased. During the 1990s medical costs increased 51.7%
and general inflation, which would be reflected in lost
wages, increased about 26% [34].
Another explanation is that cases with claims of more
serious injuries were tried to juries in 2001, compared to
1992. This last possible explanation needs elaboration.
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Vidmar et al’s study of medical malpractice litigation in
Florida, though not focusing exclusively on juries, found
that during the first 3 years of the 2000s there were more
settled cases involving claims of negligent deaths and
fewer cases involving less serious injuries, when compared
with the first part of the 1990s [39]. Since settlements
typically occur 3 to 6 years after a case is filed, this change
in case mix occurred during the middle of the 1990s, not at
the turn of the new century. The change in types of cases is
unlikely to explain all of the increase in awards, but it does
appear to be a possible partial explanation. Like many
other aspects of the medical malpractice controversy, the
questions about damages are complex and at present we do
not have totally satisfactory answers to all the questions
that are raised about damages.
Postverdict Adjustments: More about the Jury Trial
in Context
Research evidence indicates that large verdicts seldom
withstand postverdict judicial review. There are four main
processes by which awards are reduced [36, 40, 41]. First,
even though we commonly speak of trial by jury, it should
properly be called ‘‘trial by judge and jury.’’ The jury verdict
must be ratified by the trial judge in a ‘‘judgment’’ and he or
she may reduce the award if it appears out of line with the
evidence. Alternatively, if the judgment is appealed to a
higher court, that court may also reduce the award. A third
mechanism involves ‘‘high-low’’ agreements that, it turns
out, occur with regularity in medical malpractice trials.
Sometimes both sides agree that there was negligence but
disagree about the amount of damages and decide to have a
jury trial but set a high-low agreement prior to the trial. They
submit the case to the jury under the condition that if the jury
verdict falls below a certain amount, or even if there is a
defense verdict, the plaintiff will receive a specified amount
of money anyway and if the verdict is above a specified
amount the defendant will pay no more than the figure
agreed to before trial. In this way both parties are protected
against outlier verdicts that either give the plaintiff little or
nothing or, alternatively, expose the defendant to an award
that could severely injure finances. The public and even the
court may be unaware of the agreement. However, most
common of all, the plaintiff and the defendant negotiate a
posttrial settlement that is less than the jury verdict. The
defense threatens to appeal the verdict to a higher court,
potentially causing the verdict to be overturned, or resulting
in a greatly reduced award. In addition, an appeal increases
the plaintiff’s legal costs and delays, perhaps for years, the
moment when the plaintiff will receive any money. Rather
than undertake the risks and delay, the plaintiff settles for a
lesser amount [3, 36, 41].
Plaintiffs are willing to negotiate lesser amounts for
three main reasons. First, many plaintiffs need or want the
money immediately rather than wait for the years it will
take to get the money if the case is appealed. Second, there
is always a risk that an appeals court will reduce the award
or even overturn the verdict. Third, most of these outlier
awards greatly exceed the medical provider’s insurance
coverage. While plaintiffs and their lawyers could attempt
to foreclose on the defendant’s assets, their lawyers are
extremely reluctant to do so and counsel their clients
against such actions [3]. Therefore, the plaintiff negotiates
a settlement around the defendant’s insurance coverage.
High-low agreements, too, usually take cognizance of the
upper limits of insurance coverage [36].
Several studies report some of the largest malpractice
awards that made headlines ultimately resulted in settle-
ments that were only between 5% and 10% of the original
jury verdict [18, 39, 41, 42]. Using closed-claim files from
Texas, Hyman et al. found that 75% of plaintiffs received a
payout less than the verdict [18]. The average settlement
for all cases was 29% less than the verdict; and the larger
the verdict amount, the greater was the reduction during
posttrial proceedings. For plaintiffs with verdicts equaling
or exceeding $2.5 million, 98 received less than the verdict,
averaging approximately 56% of the verdict. Hyman et al.
[18] found that insurance policy limits were the most
important factor involved in the reductions. Of the Florida
medical malpractice cases involving verdicts of $1 million
or more, the mean settlement was 67% of the original jury
verdict [42].
Limitations of the Data
Both quantitative and qualitative data are represented in
this review of literature. The quantitative data from Florida
and Texas are comprehensive of all malpractice claims
since state law requires that all malpractice claims, even
those settled without a payment, be reported to the
respective Departments of Insurance. The North Carolina
data is based on a comprehensive survey of all 100 North
Carolina courts. Data collected by the U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS) was based on a plan involving
comprehensive collection of all cases in the 75 largest U.S.
jurisdictions. These latter data are reasonably complete
although the author of this article discovered that some
cases in Chicago and Philadelphia were not included
because they were being appealed and the records were not
available when the survey occurred. It is likely that the BJS
under-represent large awards because these are the cases
most likely to be appealed. The qualitative data are based
on smaller samples and, of course, are subject to unreli-
ability of coding and interpretation, even when attempts are
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made to obtain reliability checks. For example, studies
involving physician rations of whether negligence occurred
find some considerable inter-rater disagreement. Interviews
with lawyers about litigation strategies, including ones
conducted by the author of this article, are, of course,
always subject to unreliability and bias even when pre-
cautions are taken to avoid such problems. Yet taken as a
whole, the data, both quantitative and qualitative, show
remarkable consistency across settings and between
researchers.
Discussion
Trial by judge and jury is an important component of the
American tort system bearing on claims of medical negli-
gence. However, it is only one part of that system, despite
the attention it receives. Most settlements of malpractice
claims occur around the negotiation table rather than in the
jury room. Widely held views of irresponsible and
incompetent juries held by doctors and by the general
public do not stand up to empirical evidence. This is not to
say that every jury verdict is correct, but when verdicts for
plaintiffs are compared against verdicts for doctors and
against alternative criteria, such as ratings by medical
professionals and decisions by legal professionals, juries
come out reasonably well. Qualitative data from juror
interviews and actual jury deliberations support the quan-
titative findings. These conclusions suggest the need to
focus on other parts of the claims resolution process and
other factors that affect professional liability insurance
increases, including the professional liability insurance
cycle [4].
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